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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002 the United States indicted Arthur Andersen, one of the
major accounting firms in the nation at that time, causing Andersen's
downfall.' Since that time, prosecutors have been more cautious about
indicting major financial institutions. Instead, prosecutors have utilized
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution
Agreements (NPAs) to curb illegal corporate conduct, rather than
relying on criminal charges.2 HSBC's recent record DPA of $1.92
billion in December 2012 demonstrated the compromise prosecutors
sought between a harsh money laundering indictment and the need for
HSBC to be held responsible for its illegal actions.' The HSBC
agreement was also notable for U.S. District Judge John Gleeson's
approval and oversight of the DPA.4 Judge Gleeson's role in HSBC's
DPA was a shift from the norm and perhaps established a precedent for
future judicial oversight in DPAs, which this Note will argue could
greatly improve the current way DPAs operate.
Part II of this Note analyzes the history of corporate prosecution
1. Matt Taibbi, New Bank Investigations: Real Action, or More of the Same?,
ROLLING STONE TAIBBLOG (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/new-bank-investigations-real-action-or-
more-of-the-same-20130808?print-true (taking a pretty aggressive stance by calling for
high level executives to be sentenced to jail time).
2. Note that while prosecutors use both NPAs and DPAs this Note focuses solely on
DPAs.
3. Ben Protess and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle
Charges of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-
money-laundering/.
4. Jonathan Stempel, HSBC wins OK of Record $1.92 Billion Money-Laundering
Settlement, REUTERS (July 2, 2013, 7:15 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/02/us-hsbc-settlement-laundering-
idUSBRE961 1B220130702.
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in America.5 Part III outlines the specific case of Arthur Andersen and
the prosecutorial shift to the use of DPAs.6  Part IV examines the
effectiveness of DPAs, while analyzing the deficiencies associated with
them.7 Part V discusses the impact and implementation of DPAs in the
wake of the 2008 financial crisis.8 Part VI examines the potential for
judicial oversight in DPAs and its advantages and argues that
congressional legislation is needed to amend the Speedy Trial Act to
require judicial oversight in DPAs in an effort to make them fair and
reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding each agreement.9
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Under English common law a corporation could not be
prosecuted, since in theory it could not commit a crime.10 This theory
was firmly entrenched until around 1700.11 However, courts began to
step in once corporations started to gain greater power and have
significant societal consequences. 12 One of the first instances where the
King's Bench imputed liability to a corporation was in 1635 when the
Bench found a corporation liable for nonfeasance, or the failure to
prevent a bad act.1 After 1635, the courts had to determine whether the
corporation had failed to prevent a bad act or whether the corporation
actively engaged in a bad act, known as misfeasance, for which the
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. I, Sir William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 455 (1765).
11. Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the
Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J.
126, 134 (2008). Diskant compares the United States' unique practice of corporate criminal
liability with some of its other Western counterparts. Id. In his discussion on corporate
prosecutorial history, he outlines that many people before the nineteenth century did not
believe corporations could be prosecuted because they lacked the required moral
blameworthiness to be placed in the criminal system. Id.
12. Ved P. Nanda, Chapter 2 Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is A
New Approach Warranted?, 9 IUS GENTIUM 63, 66 (2011). The article argues that the need
for greater corporate penalties has been severely hindered by the power of the regulatory
state. Id. The article calls for scholars and academics to see the negative consequences of
the current system and implement reform. Id.
13. Id.
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corporation would not be held liable.14  If a corporation committed
misfeasance, it was not indicted, on the theory that a corporation was
not a person and lacked the mental capacity to commit an illegal act.' 5
These first instances of corporate criminal liability usually were against
* * 16quasi-corporations, such as municipalities for a public nuisance.
Subsequently though, corporations were held liable for minor civil
offenses, such as the violation of police regulations.' 7
By the 1800s public corporations were held criminally liable for
the sort of public nuisance violations for which quasi-corporations had
previously been held liable.' 8 As the commercial corporations began to
gain more power and influence, courts started to impute criminal
liability to corporations for all offenses except for those that required
criminal intent.19 By the mid-1800s American courts held corporations
liable for misfeasance.2 0
It was not until the twentieth century that American corporations
were held liable for crimes of intent. 2' The case establishing this
doctrine in American jurisprudence was New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Company v. United States.22 In this seminal case,
Justice Day held that a corporation is responsible for acts, not directly
within its control, which it has authorized an agent to complete. 23 Since
14. Id.
15. Id. at 66.
16. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1480 (1996) These instances of public nuisances usually involved a
bridge or road that the previous inhabitants of a village or town had erected and maintained,
which the new inhabitants of the village or town were required to maintain. Id.
17. James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
8:21 (3d).
18. Khanna, supra note 16, at 1481.
19. Id., at 1481. In England this practice began to take hold around the mid-nineteenth
century as it did in America. Id.
20. See e.g., State v. Morris & E.R. Co., 23 N.J. 360 (1852) (holding that an indictment
for misfeasance would stand against a corporation); see also Commonwealth v. Proprietors
of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339 (1854) (holding that a corporation could be indicted
for misfeasance as well as nonfeasance). These initial cases involved public nuisance
incidents similar to those quasi-corporations had previously began to be held liable for in
England.
21. Khanna, supra note 16, at 1482.
22. 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909) (holding that corporations no longer were immune
from criminal prosecutions). The theory was that the corporation could be imputed with
knowledge of its employee's actions during the course of their employment and as a result
could be criminally culpable for those actions. Id.
23. Id. at 493-94.
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this case, corporations have been responsible for the criminal actions of
their employees if the employees were acting to benefit the corporation
and their illegal actions were within the scope of their employment.24
Subsequent cases expanded this doctrine to include liability for
corporate agents acting without authority or even contrary to express
instructions given to them.25 The doctrine was further enlarged to hold
corporations liable for willful employee actions that did not have a
criminal or evil purpose.26
While the doctrine for which corporations could be held
criminally liable was well established in America before the 1990s,
corporate indictments played a small role in criminal law.2 However,
the nature of corporate indictments began to change with the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.28 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act to
give judges more control in the ultimate length of the sentence and to
reduce unjustifiably wide disparities in sentencing.29 The Sentencing
Guidelines drastically increased the potential consequences for illegal
corporate conduct.30 Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines increased
incentives for corporations to take preventative measures to ensure
employees would not commit crime. 3 ' They also created incentives for
24. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty:
Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 797, 802-
803 (2013). Markoff argues that the indictment and subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen
was an atypical example of what happens to a large corporation when it is indicted. Id.
Rather, for the vast majority of corporations an indictment is not a death sentence. Id.
25. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972)
(attempting through its holding to make corporations more cognizant of their employees
actions and to deter them from lackadaisical supervision of their business activities).
26. Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963)
(holding that while the truck drivers did not necessarily act with an evil or criminal intent,
Steere Tank Lines could still be held accountable for their actions).
27. Markoff, supra note 24, at 803. While corporations were prosecuted before the
1990s, the fines were very small compared to the fines corporations are subject to today. Id.
Part of the reason for the guidelines was to increase corporate punishment because the small
fines often did not rise to the level of damaged caused. Id.
28. Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C § 3551 (1984); see Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop
M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development,
Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205,
206 (1993).
29. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 5 (1988) (providing background to the
guidelines and outlining six different compromises included within the guidelines).
30. Markoff, supra note 24, at 803.
31. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 28, at 210.
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corporations to take steps to ensure that employees who committed a
crime would be held liable for their conduct.32
III. TRANSITION TO THE USE OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
The Department of Justice (DOJ) began using DPAs3 3 in the
1990s. 34 Before the 1990s, prosecutors were forced to choose between
indicting a corporation and not pressing charges at all.3 In more recent
years, however, DPAs have become the main tool the government uses
to curtail corporate criminal conduct. 36 From 2000 to 2012 there were
245 corporate settlement agreements.37 From 1992 to 1999 there were
only twelve prosecution agreements. In 2012 alone, the DOJ and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) entered into 36 settlement
agreements. 39 The financial penalties that came with these recent DPAs
have been fairly substantial, with the monetary penalties resulting from
32. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 28, at 210 (noting that the sentencing guidelines
established a consensus that corporate wrongdoers should be held accountable for their
actions).
33. A DPA is a voluntary agreement that takes the place of a criminal charge in which
a prosecutor agrees to withhold the prosecution of a defendant so long as the defendant
complies with the provisions outlined in the agreement. For example a case of corporate
fraud might be settled with a DPA, which could include provisions such as fines, corporate
reforms, and full cooperation with the prosecution during the investigation. Once the
defendant has complied with the provisions of the agreement the prosecutor will dismiss the
charges. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to A Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLuM. L. REv. 1863, 1863-
65 (2005).
34. Memo from Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, Antitrust Division Enters Into
First Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.martindale.com/members/ArticleAtachment.aspx?od=296452&id=1692684&fi
lename=asr-1692686.Antitrust.pdf (outlining the use of DPAs by the Antitrust Division
under the Obama administration).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1.
37. Client Letter from Gibson Dunn, 2012 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAS) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAS) (January 3,
2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEndUpdate-
CorporateDeferredProsecution-NonProsecutionAgreements.pdf (note that the 245
agreements include both DPAs and NPAs).
38. Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution
Agreements, U. OF VA. SCH. OF L.,
http:// lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution-agreements/home.suphp (last updated Sept.
9, 2013) (the agreements referred to include DPAs and NPAs).
39. Gibson Dunn, supra note 37 at 2 (this includes NPAs as well as DPAs).
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the 2012 agreements netting almost $9 billion by themselves.40
However, many people have questioned whether these penalties actually
- * 41curtail corporate criminal actions. In response to critics, leading
proponents of DPAs, such as Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer,
have argued that DPAs force corporations to acknowledge and correct
their misconduct without the potentially disastrous effects of an
indictment.42
A. The Arthur Andersen Collapse
The Arthur Andersen collapse in 2002 truly cemented DPAs as
the preferred method for dealing with corporate misconduct. On March
14, 2002, Arthur Andersen was indicted on a felony count of
obstruction of justice43 resulting from employees shredding documents
relating to the Enron scandal.4 On June 15, 2002, Arthur Andersen
was convicted in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.45 However, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction on May
31, 2005.46 Yet by the time the reversal took effect, the damage to
Andersen had already been accomplished. 7 Though the maximum
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal
Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV.
933, 942 (2005) (arguing that corporations should essentially have three strikes before they
are ordered to dissolve); Randall D. Eliason, We Need to Indict Them, LEGAL TIMES, (Sept.
22, 2008), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/eliason/LegalTimes_9_22_08.pdf (arguing that DPAs
will not deter corporate criminal conduct).
42. Lanny A. Breuer, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the New York City Bar
Association (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131 (discussing the
advantages of DPAs and the tremendous accountability they force corporations to have).
43. Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917, 921
(2003) (describing Arthur Andersen's often aggressive legal strategy in connection with its
obstruction to justice charges and the fallout that they had).
44. Floyd Norris, Execution Before Trial for Andersen, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/15/business/enron-s-many-strands-news-analysis-
execution-before-trial-for-andersen.html (describing the consequences of an Andersen
indictment and the small possibility that Andersen would be able to survive even if they
won at trial).
45. United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004).
46. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005) (holding that due
to flawed jury instruction the conviction could not be upheld).
47. James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48
S. TEx. L. REv. 509, 510 (July 2006).
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penalty for Andersen would have been only a $500,000 fine, many
people believed the indictment itself was all that was needed to
condemn the firm.4 8 The firm was effectively destroyed well before the
conviction because the vast majority of its major clients defected. 49 The
majority of Andersen's 88,000 employees were either unemployed or
no longer with the firm by the time of the initial conviction.o In
America alone, 28,000 employees lost their jobs, but only a handful of
them were involved in the document shredding.
B. Implementation of DPAs
DPAs allow the government to impose fines on the corporation
and force the corporation to be monitored.52 In this way the SEC or
DOJ is able to ensure corporate compliance with the provisions
established by the DPA. 53  In a DPA, the prosecutor files charges
against the entity but agrees to suspend prosecution as long as the
corporation complies with the terms outlined in the agreement. 54 The
agreement usually consists of an affirmation that the company will fully
cooperate with the government investigation, including investigations of
employees. 5 Additionally, DPAs usually require the improvement or
enactment of internal compliance programs, which may include
independent monitors. 6 DPAs almost always include fines or penalties,
and the company has to refund any illegally obtained money or place
48. Norris, supra note 44, at Cl.
49. Kelly, supra note 47, at 510 (giving a general overview of the facts behind the
indictment and why Andersen was unable to survive); Penelope Patsuris, Andersen Clients
Evacuate Post- Verdict, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2002, 4:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2002/03/13/0313andersen.html. In the six months following Arthur
Andersen's prohibition from auditing clients on August 31, the firm lost almost 1.4 billion
in revenue. Id. Some of the major clients that defected were RailWorks, Alliant Energy,
and Brio Software. Id.
50. Kelly, supra note 47, at 510.
51. Taibbi, supra note 1.
52. Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shifi, Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. TIMES (April
9, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/washington/09justice.html?_r-l &pagewanted=all&.
53. Id.
54. P.J. Meitl, Who's the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate America, 34
N. Ky. L. REv. 1, 14 (2007).
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 2.
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those gains in a special fund.57 DPAs do not prevent the prosecution of
individuals within the corporation regardless of whether the government
agrees to defer prosecution. 58
DPAs have created controversy in some high profile instances.
One such instance was when a medical supply company agreed to pay
the former Attorney General John Ashcroft's firm up to $52 million as
an independent monitor to avoid prosecution." Oftentimes the
companies that agree to the DPAs are actually the ones who negotiate
the fee with the outside monitors, a situation that legal scholars indicate
could open the possibility for companies to exploit the system because
they may be willing to pay the independent monitors more to enhance
leniency. 60
C. Controlling Mechanisms for Deferred Prosecution Agreements
The following memos from high-ranking Department of Justice
officials provide a structure for how DPAs are implemented. As of this
date, there has not been any formal congressional legislation on DPAs.
While the memos have continued to make improvements to the process,
there is still a need for judicial and congressional oversight. 6 1
1. The Holder Memo
In 1999 then-Assistant Attorney General Eric Holder issued a
memo (the Holder Memo) dictating practices surrounding a
corporation's willingness to cooperate with the DOJ.62 The Memo
established a series of factors to be considered when contemplating an
57. Id. at 11.
58. Breuer, supra note 42.
59. Lichtblau, supra note 52.
60. Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny to Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (January
10, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/O/10/washington/Ojustice.html?pagewanted=all&r=0.
61. Inna Dexter, Regulating the Regulators: The Need for More Guidelines on
Prosecutorial Conduct in Corporate Investigations, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 515, 516
(2007). Note though that Dexter mainly argues for congressional legislation because too
much deference is given to prosecutors in DPAs. Id.
62. Susan B. Heyman, Bottoms-Up: An Alternative Approach for Investigating
Corporate Malfeasance, 37 AM. J. CRiM. L. 163, 173 (2010).
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indictment of a corporation.63 The Holder Memo also enhanced the
doctrine of respondeat superior.64 Corporations were to be held liable
for their agents' actions regardless of whether the corporations had
internal policies prohibiting such conduct.65 The Memo urged
prosecutors to consider charging the corporation in addition to charging
individual actors within the corporation. 66
2. The Thompson Memo
In response to the Enron scandal and the Arthur Andersen crisis,
then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a memorandum
(the Thompson Memo), which superseded the Holder Memo, titled
"Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations."67  The
Thompson memo left prosecutors with wide discretion as to whether to
indict a corporation.68  The disparity in power generated by the
Thompson Memo created a lack of transparency and potential
infringement on constitutional rights. 69  The Thompson Memo
toughened the standards outlined in the Holder Memo and increased
scrutiny on corporate cooperation.70  The Department's message had
63. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. to All Component Heads
and U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF
[hereinafter Holder Memo].
64. Carmen Couden, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or Just A
Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 408 (2005).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys, regarding Principles of Fed. Prosecution of
Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum]. See Joan-Alice M. Burn, United States v. Stein: Has the "Perfect Storm"
Led to a Sea Change?, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 862-4 (2007).
68. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 67.
69. Dexter, supra note 61, at 516. Companies were not informed which of the nine
factors in the Thompson Memo would be most important during their investigation. Id.
Due to this ambiguity prosecutors obtained almost limitless cooperation. Id. Also, to
determine whether a company was cooperating, prosecutors were informed to look at
whether the company had waived its attorney client privilege, and whether the company was
paying the legal fees of employees under investigation. Id. This created incentives for
companies to disregard their employees' constitutional rights. Id.
70. Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, The Thompson Memo: Its Predecessors, Its Successor,
and Its Effect on Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 23, 26 (2007).
McFayden argues that the Thompson Memo encouraged prosecutors to assess a
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two parts: (1) corporations that cooperated would receive major
benefits, possibly affecting their survival," and (2) the cooperation
must be authentic to ensure that the corporation received such
benefits.72
3. The McNulty Memo
In response to a District Court's decision that the Thompson
Memo violated constitutional rights,'73 then-Attorney General Paul
McNulty issued a memorandum on December 6, 2012, also titled
"Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" (the
McNulty Memo).74  This Memo superseded the Thompson Memo,
and revised its language regarding the waiver of corporate privileges. 76
Under the McNulty Memo, a waiver of attorney-client privilege was no
longer required to find that the corporation cooperated with the
government during an investigation. Some critics viewed the Memo
as an effort to quiet opponents rather than make meaningful changes
because it did not take away many of the pressures that prosecutors
could place on companies. 78 Prosecutors could still pressure companies
corporation's cooperation by the factors outlined in the memo. Id. These factors essentially
required corporations to be extremely deferential to prosecutors and forced corporations to
help catch illegal conduct. Id.
71. Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Criminal Div.,
Remarks to the Assoc. of Certified Fraud Exam'rs Mid-South Chapter (Sept. 2,
2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/2004/september/09-02-04wray-
remarks-memphis.pdf.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The case was
against KPMG employees. Id. The court was troubled by the fact that the Thompson
Memo took into account whether KPMG would pay for the attorney fees of former
employees should they be indicted. Id. This could affect their right to counsel and fair trial
and as a result violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id.
74. See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't
Components and United States Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/2004/september/09-02-04wray-
remarks-memphis.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
75. Heyman, supra note 62, at 174.
76. Stephen L. Hiyama, Confusing Prosecutorial Discretion with Ethics: A Misguided
Proposal to Amend the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, MICH. B.J. 40, 40 (Feb.
2007).
77. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 74, at 7.
78. Heyman, supra note 62, at 176. While the memo appeared to make some
TOO BIG TO JAIL
into waiving the right to an attorney because the McNulty Memo still
allowed them to consider a company's waiver in deciding whether the
corporation cooperated fully with the investigation.79
4. The Filip Memo
On August 28, 2008, then-Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip
announced revisions to the United States Attorney Manual (the Filip
Memo) to correct existing problems with bringing corporate criminal
charges.80  The Memo instructs prosecutors to judge corporate
compliance during an investigation by whether a corporation produces
"relevant facts." 8  An issue with the Memo is that there will be times
when the "relevant facts" are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 82 As a result, corporations still face the possibility of being
forced to reveal privileged information should the government deem
that the information contains "relevant facts." 83 While it appears that
the government has placed more restrictions on prosecutors to request
waivers, the factors for corporate cooperation have become increasingly
84vague. Now corporations are left without guidance on how to gain
favor with government investigations.85 Since corporations still have to
speculate as to what prosecutors perceive as cooperation, they will
likely be forced to disclose more information than is legally required. 86
meaningful changes, many questions still remained as to the amount and nature of pressure
that prosecutors were still able to place on corporations. Id. For example, while the
McNulty Memo contained revisions for prosecutors to obtain approval for waiver requests,
there was nothing in the revisions that indicated such approvals would be significant in any
appreciable way. Id.
79. John K. Villa, The McNulty Memorandum: A Reversal in Practice or in Name
Only?, ACC DOCKET 88, 91 (Apr. 2007).
80. Brendan J. Keefe, Revisions of the Thompson Memorandum and Avoiding the Stein
Problems: A Review ofthe Federal Policy on the Prosecution ofBusiness Organizations, 42
Conn. L. Rev. 273, 276 (2009).
81. U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual tit. 9, § 9-28.300 (2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
82. Heyman, supra note 62, at 178.
83. Id. at 178.
84. Id. at 179.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 179-80.
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IV. ISSUES RELATED To DPAs
A. DPA Deficiencies
1. DPAs Lack a Deterrent Effect
Opponents argue that DPAs do not deter misconduct and often
result in a meager reprimand for corporate criminal activity." Critics
maintain that the approach of letting corporations escape with monetary
fines as long as they promise to self-regulate creates no disincentives for
corporations to abstain from fraud or white-collar crime." Other
concerns about DPAs have come from the white-collar criminal defense
bar over the payment of attorney fees, 89 the use of independent
monitors, 90 and the destruction of the attorney-client privilege. 91
Critics of the current policy argue that DPAs do not offer the
same deterrent effect as a criminal prosecution. 92 One theory is that a
criminal prosecution carries with it much more weight and stigma than a
DPA entered into with the government. 93 Corporations may be able to
portray fines and negotiated agreements as "business as usual," but it
would be very difficult for them to characterize a criminal indictment in
the same way.94  Critics argue that because the threat of criminal
liability is off the table corporations are more willing to toe the line of
corporate misconduct or even step over it. 95
87. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself Prosecutors Use
Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutors-are-lenient-as-
companies-break-the-law.html?pagewanted=all.
88. Id.
89. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REv. 1775,
1794-95 (2011).
90. Id. at 1795.
91. Id.
92. See e.g., Ramirez, supra note 41, at 942 (arguing for a corporate death penalty
law); Kyle Noonan, The Case for a Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 Geo.
WASH. L. REv. 602, 614 (2012) (arguing for Congress to pass legislation authorizing
prosecutors to revoke state charters in certain situations).
93. Eliason, supra note 41.
94. Id.
95. Id.
468 [Vol. 18
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The legal system suffers when prosecutors choose not to indict
corporations where the fraud and misconduct were especially
egregious.96 The penalties that the DPAs enforce are relatively small
compared to the overall revenues of the large financial institutions that
enter into the agreements. 97 Some lawyers suggest that companies are
willing to take more risks because they know that if they get into trouble
they have a high probability of getting a DPA. 98 DPAs may make it
financially viable for corporations to bear the risk of criminal business
practices due to financial gains made from such practices without the
threat of an indictment. 99 Moreover, because of the enormous size,
resources, complexity, and infrastructure of large financial institutions,
they are able to commit illegal conduct on a scale that is unachievable
by an individual.' 00 Some argue that while indicting a corporation does
have drawbacks, such as harming innocent third parties, these defects
are part of the criminal system as a whole. 01 For instance, when an
individual is sent to jail, his small family economic unit must bear the ill
effects of his incarceration.102
2. The Misconception of the Corporate Death Sentence
There is a further issue about the necessity of DPAs. Some
scholars argue that the failure of Arthur Andersen following its
indictment was an anomaly and that in reality corporate indictments are
not the death sentences that they are made out to be.' 0 3  Excluding
Arthur Andersen, no company indicted between 2001-2010 went out of
business following a conviction.104 There are three explanations for
why this has not occurred. The first is that public conviction and
subsequent destruction of a company is the exception rather than the
96. Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at A38.
97. Id.
98. Lichtblau, supra note 52.
99. Id.
100. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM.
CIM. L. REv. 1481, 1484 (2009).
101. Id. at 1486.
102. Id.
103. See generally Markoff, supra note 24.
104. Id. at 827 (noting that Arthur Andersen was initially convicted but the Supreme
Court reversed the decision and Andersen's demise was the result of the indictment).
2014] 469
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
rule.'05 The second possibility is that uncertainty of conviction at trial
as an alternative to the more lenient DPAs is what causes companies to
fail.106 The third possible explanation is that the DOJ is only pursuing
the companies that are financially able to weather an indictment and
letting the weaker ones go or entering into DPAs with them.107
B. Why DPAs Are More Effective Than Corporate Indictments
1. Corporations Are Incapable of Moral Responsibility
Many scholars argue that it is a mistake to attribute the moral
responsibility that comes with a criminal prosecution to a
corporation.10 Corporations lack the intentional characteristics to make
it morally responsible for actions they take.109 Additionally, with the
current system of vicarious liability, corporations are punished even
though they may have been supervising their employees."' 0 Because of
the significant consequences of criminal charges and the lack of a
defense to vicarious liability, the possibility of an indictment due to the
actions of a single employee has forced corporations to settle weak
claims and has forced individuals with a stake in the company to bear
the burden of sanctions never approved by a judge."' In the case of
Arthur Andersen, only a tiny fraction of the company's employees were
actually involved in shredding documents, yet almost 28,000 employees
lost their jobs because the corporation was alleged to be responsible for
105. Id.
106. Id. (observing that Arthur Andersen's conviction was overturned by the Supreme
Court and most of the other convictions referred to were the result of guilty pleas and not
jury trials).
107. Id.
108. John Hasnas, The Centenary of A Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1329, 1331 (2009).
109. Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 Bus. ETHICS Q.
531, 545, 551 (2003). According to Velasquez, a corporation's "lack of intentional
characteristics" means that just because we may attribute intentional qualities to groups that
comprise a corporation the collective body of the groups does not have real intentions. Id.
For example, nobody believes that all the groups in the United States who collectively buy
and sell a particular commodity make a distinct intentional agent. Id.
110. See Khanna, supra note 16, at 1495-96.
111. Cheryl L. Evans, The Case for More Rational Corporate Criminal Liability: Where
Do We Go from Here?, 41 STETSON L. REv. 21, 29 (2011).
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the actions of a few. Similarly, holding that corporation criminally
liable based on the collective knowledge of all of its employees places
unrealistic burdens on corporations to monitor their employees.112
2. The Public Ramifications of an Indictment are Too Great
Furthermore, the public benefits that are gained from indicting a
corporation are often outweighed by the consequences. For example,
even if Arthur Andersen had ultimately been convicted, no one would
have been eligible for imprisonment under the law." 3  While Arthur
Andersen had to pay the maximum statutory penalty, it was still
significantly less than what they would have paid if they had entered
into a DPA with a government agency. 114
Fundamentally, DPAs arm prosecutors with formidable
weapons to ensure corporate compliance without disastrous collateral
consequences. Under the appropriate circumstance, DPAs can correct
and restore a company's operating practice and preserve its viability
into the future.15 While DPAs do not come with the stigma of a
criminal indictment, they allow prosecutors to achieve many of the
same goals while leaving out the problems inherent with criminal
indictments. As Lanny Breuer stated in a speech to the New York Bar
Association, DPAs give prosecutors something other than a "blunt
instrument" to wield against corporations." 6
112. Nanda, supra note 12, at 85.
113. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 107, 109 (2006).
114. Id.
115. Nanda, supra note 12, at 80 (commenting that a DPA gives a company a chance to
maintain its financial integrity into the future by forcing the company to amend its corrupt
business practices and pay a hefty fine while not destroying a company the way an
indictment would).
116. Breuer, supra note 42.
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V. DPAs IN THE WAKE OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. The Use of DPAs in the Wake of the Financial Crisis
1. SAC and the Lack of Indictments Relating to the Credit Crisis
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the DOJ and state
prosecutors have routinely used DPAs for institutions that were
considered "too big to fail." The most recent example of this is the JP
Morgan Chase DPA. On January 7, 2014, JP Morgan Chase and CEO
Jamie Dimon agreed to a $1.7 billion DPA for their role in Bernie
Madoff s Ponzi scheme.'" 7  JP Morgan was not prosecuted despite
turning a "blind eye" to the scheme and helping Madoff build a "house
of cards.""' 8 However, in other instances prosecutors have occasionally
signaled their willingness to indict major financial institutions on
charges related to the financial crisis. On November 8, 2012, SAC
became the first major Wall Street firm in the last twenty-five years to
plead guilty to criminal charges." 9 SAC's guilty plea included a $1.2
billion penalty, including $900 million in criminal fines and a $284
million civil forfeiture of profits.120  SAC Capital had delivered an
average annual net return of thirty percent over the past twenty years.121
The DOJ alleged that SAC permitted a pervasive insider-trading scheme
that generated hundreds of millions of dollars and even hired employees
that had questionable insider trading histories.' 22 Preet Bhara, the U.S.
117. Brian Ross & Aaron Katersky, Once Again, Is JP Morgan Chase Too Big to Jail?,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/madoff-ponzi-scheme-
prosecutors-find-jpmorgan-chase-big/story?id=21448264.
118. Id.
119. Ben Protess, SAC Pleads Guilty, Then Judge Calls a Timeout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2013, at B2 (under the headline Hedge Fund Pleads Guilty, Then Judge Calls a Timeout).
120. Id. These fines were in addition to $616 million in fines SAC already had to pay to
the SEC to resolve a related civil case.
121. Robert Wood, SAC Indictment Could Have Silver Lining, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2013,
8:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/08/26/sac-indictment-could-have-
silver-lining/.
122. Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, SAC Capital Is Indicted, and Called a Magnet for
Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at Al (under the headline Fund Indicted; Called
Magnet for Cheating).
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attorney in Manhattan who has led the investigation of SAC,123 stated
that the situation at SAC was "substantial, pervasive and on a scale
without known precedent in the history of hedge funds."l 24  In
addressing the rarity of indicting major institutions, Bhara stated that the
"pendulum may have swung too far in the direction of not holding
institutions accountable."l 25
While SAC's indictment may indicate that major institutions are
not above prosecution, no high level Wall Street executive has faced
criminal charges in relation to the financial crisis.126 Even though the
DOJ has indicated that it is investigating civil charges against major
banks for their part in falsifying mortgage-backed securities, the statute
of limitations for most of the alleged crimes has passed.127 Moreover,
federal prosecutors and Attorney General Eric Holder have warned
against prosecuting big banks in the wake of the financial crisis.128
Some critics have argued that SAC's indictment did not signal an end to
the "too big to jail" theory on big banks.129 Critics have indicated that
even when SAC was at its peak it was not in the top ten of the largest
hedge funds and its failure would not threaten the financial system.130
2. DPAs Following the Financial Crisis
While prosecutors have been reluctant to indict firms relating to
the 2008 crisis, there have been a number of significant DPAs. One of
the most recent DPAs involves J.P. Morgan. In October 2013, J.P.
Morgan's executives and the DOJ entered into a tentative $13 billion
123. Peter Lattman, SAC Is Said to Weigh Plea Deal in Insider Trading Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at B1 (under the headline SAC is Said to Weigh Plea Deal to End
Case).
124. Lattman & Protess, supra note 122.
125. Protess, supra note 119.
126. Kara Scannell, Top Judge Criticises DOJfor Not Holding Individuals Accountable,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2013, 9:48 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dbl923d0-4bd2-Ile3-
8203-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2kpYAfiai.
127. Id.
128. Mark Gongloff, SAC Capital Indictment Does Not Mean the End of 'Too Big to
Jail', HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2013, 11:53 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/sac-capital-indictment-too-big-to-
jail-n_3652646.html.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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DPA for Morgan's alleged sales of fraudulent mortgage-backed
securities.' 31  Thirteen billion dollars represents the largest penalty
levied against a single company for actions relating to the financial
crisis.,13
The DOJ's settlement with J.P. Morgan followed a practice of
entering into agreements with major financial institutions in connection
with the LIBOR rate fixing scandal. In June 2012, Barclays settled
LIBOR-related charges for a record $450 million.133 In the middle of
the financial crisis, creditors claim that Barclays reported false figures
that at times influenced a benchmark for student loans, credit cards, and
mortgages.134 Regulators were concerned that major banks set certain
rates to their advantage during the crisis to alleviate concerns that they
were not financially secure.' 35  UBS also entered into a DPA with the
DOJ over the LIBOR scandal. UBS agreed to pay $1.5 billion in
penalties to settle claims with U.S., U.K., and Swiss authorities.136 The
DPA into which UBS entered with the U.S. DOJ covered all of its
subsidiaries except UBS Securities Japan.' 37 The investigation leading
to the DPA revealed six years of misconduct by 45 members of UBS's
staff who attempted to influence interest rates in an effort to strengthen
131. Doug Stanglin & Kevin MIcCoy, JPMorgan, DOJ Near $13B Settlement, USA
TODAY (Oct. 19, 2013, 7:23 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/10/19/jp-morgan-justice-department-
deal-settlement-13b/3052383. Note that this DPA is distinct from the one that JP Morgan
entered into with the DOJ over the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme. This record-setting DPA
was a reflection of JP Morgan's actions during the 2008 financial crisis.
132. Sari Horwitz & Danielle Douglas, JPMorgan Agrees to Tentative $13 Billion
Settlement with U.S. over Bad Mortgages, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/jpmorgan-close-to-1 3-billion-deal-with-
justice/2013/10/19/7f5 1 c918-38f8- l1 e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f story.html.
133. Hala Touryalai, Why UBS Is Better Off Than Barclays in Libor Rigging Case,
FORBES (Dec. 3, 2012, 1:05 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/12/03/why-ubs-is-better-off-than-barclays-
in-libor-rigging-case/.
134. Ben Protess & Mark Scott, Barclays Settles Regulators' Claims Over Manipulation
ofKey Rates, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/barclays-said-to-settle-regulatory-claims-over-
benchmark-manipulation/.
135. Id.
136. Mark Thompson & James O'Toole, UBS Pays $1.5 Billion to Settle Libor Claims,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 19, 2012, 7:45 AM),
\http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/19/news/companies/ubs-libor/.
137. Id.
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the bank's image during the financial crisis.'38
In December 2012, following the DPAs involving Barclays and
UBS, HSBC agreed to forfeit $1.2 billion and enter into a DPA with the
DOJ and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office.139 In addition to the
$1.2 billion forfeiture, the DPA required HSBC to pay $700 million in
fines.140 The DPA stemmed from allegations that HSBC transferred
billions to Iran and nations like it and enabled Mexican drug cartels to
transfer money through HSBC's U.S. subsidiaries.141 The DPA
required HSBC to strengthen internal controls, refrain from illegal
activity for five years, and for an independent monitor to assess the
bank's progress and the strength of its internal controls.142 The $1.92
billion penalty was the largest U.S.-imposed penalty against a bank. 43
However, the HSBC DPA was different from both the Barclays and
UBS DPAs because of judicial involvement. HSBC's settlement was
announced on December 11, 2012, but U.S. District Judge John Gleeson
did not approve it until July 2, 2013.144 While both HSBC and the
government contended that the Court did not have the authority to
approve or reject the DPA, Judge Gleeson stated that he was exercising
his supervisory power over the agreement.145 Judge Gleeson's opinion
appears to be the first time that a judge has established that he has the
power to review and approve a DPA.1 46
Judge Gleeson reasoned that because HSBC and the DOJ had
placed their matter before the court, they had subjected themselves to
the court's authority.147 The Court was called to approve the DPA
because otherwise it would have been in violation of the Speedy Trial
138. Id.
139. Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Stempel, supra note 4.
144. Id.
145. Christie Smythe, HSBC Judge Approves $1.9B Drug-Money Laundering Accord,
BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2013 4:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-02/hsbc-
judge-approves-i -9b-drug-money-laundering-accord.html.
146. See Melissa Maleske, Judge Approves HSBC Deferred Prosecution Agreement -
with a Catch, INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/08/30/judge-approves-hsbc-deferred-prosecution-
agreement.
147. Smythe, supra note 145.
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Act's requirement that a trial begin within seventy days of an
indictment.148 Judge Gleeson instructed both the DOJ and HSBC to
make written submissions justifying the DPA and the Court's authority
in the process.149 While Judge Gleeson did not find that the Speedy
Trial Act required him to review the DPA, his authority to approve the
DPA came from his inherent supervisory authority and not from Rule
11, which prohibits judicial involvement in plea negotiations. 50
While Judge Gleeson's treatment of the HSBC case was novel,
there have been other instances in recent years where judges have
delayed approval of a DPA. One such instance occurred when Judge
Terrence Boyle from the Eastern District of North Carolina delayed
approval of a DPA between the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of North Carolina and WakeMed Health and Hospitals over
WakeMed's illegal Medicare billing practices.' 5' The district attorney
and WakeMed agreed to the DPA on December 19, 2012, but the judge
did not approve it until February 8, 2013, after he determined the DPA
was in the public's best interest. 152 This judicial scrutiny of DPAs
appears to originate from recent decisions by district court judges in
their rejection of settlements where companies do not admit
responsibility for illegal acts.15 3 The most notable of these rejections
came from Judge Jed S. Rakoff on November 28, 2011, when he
refused to approve a settlement between Citigroup Global Markets and
the SEC for $285 million.154 The SEC asserted that $285 million was a
compelling settlement, but Rakoff countered that there was a lack of
meaningful sanctions or an effort to fundamentally reform Citigroup.15 5
Judge Rakoff has been openly critical of how the DOJ has handled
148. Anthony S. Barkow & Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased Judicial Scrutiny of
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., (Aug. 20, 2013), at 2,
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/12185/original/NYLJBarkow_Cipolla_08201
3.pdf.?1377117135.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Bill Singer, Judge Rakoff Rejects SEC's "Contrivances" in Citigroup Settlement,
FORBES (11/29/2011 12:23PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billsinger/2011/11/29/judge-
rakoff-rejects-secs-contrivances-in-citigroup-settlement/.
155. Id.
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criminal prosecutions in the wake of the financial crisis.' 56 While Judge
Rakoff has indicated his disdain for the concept that some institutions
are "too big to jail," his recent criticisms have centered on the lack of
individual prosecutions following the financial crisis.' 57  Perhaps
following Judge Rakoff's lead Judge Victor Marrero, and judges from
Wisconsin and Colorado, have also delayed approval of SEC
settlements. 58
VI. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The new standard of judicial review for DPAs that Judge
Gleeson called for in the HSBC case is a positive development. Judicial
oversight of DPAs could limit the potential for prosecutorial power and
abuse under the Filip Memo that is often associated with DPAs.159
Judicial oversight could also provide a check to ensure that the terms of
the DPA are not too lenient on the company.160 While Judge Gleeson
established a precedent for the court to use its supervisory power to
regulate DPAs, a more concrete authority is needed.' 6 ' Although the
supervisory standard gives judges some basis to intervene, it would be
difficult for them to do so unless the DPA was severely deficient in
some way.1 62
To remedy this issue, Congress should amend the Speedy Trial
Act to establish a legislative basis to require judicial approval and
review of DPAs.163 Congress attempted to enact the Accountability in
Deferred Prosecution Act (the ADPA) in 2009, which was intended to
bring uniformity to the implementation of DPAs and to provide
156. Yves Smith, Judge Rakoff Blasts Bruer, Prosecution of Companies Rather Than
Individuals in Bar Speech, NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/1 1/judge-rakoff-blasts-breuer-prosecution-of-
companies-rather-than-individuals-in-bar-speech.html.
157. Antoine Gara, Fed Judge Rakoff Sees No Prosecution for Top Wall Street Execs,
THE STREET (11/12/13 5:45 PM EST), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12106189/1/federal-
judge-sees-no-prosecution-for-top-wall-street-execs.html
158. Barkow & Cipolla, supra note 148.
159. Albert Lichy, The "Too Big to Jail" Effect and the Impact on the Justice
Department's Corporate Charging Policy, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming), (manuscript 57)
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2350245.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 58.
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guidelines to prosecutors in DPA negotiations.' The proposed
legislation included a provision that required judicial approval of the
DPA but only if it was "consistent with the guidelines for such
agreements and is in the interests of justice."'65  While the proposed
ADPA included meaningful reforms, a stronger form of the proposed
legislation is needed to enable judges to conduct a thorough analysis of
DPAs. In order to approve a DPA, Congress should amend the Speedy
Trial Act to require the court to find the following: (1) whether the
DPA's terms are fair and reasonable in connection with the type of
conduct in which the company engaged;1 66 (2) whether the company has
engaged in the particular type of misbehavior before;' 67 (3) whether the
individual defendants that actually engaged in the acts have individually
been prosecuted;' 68 (4) whether the fines that will be levied against the
company deter further violations and punish the company for past
ones; 169 (5) whether the company can financially survive an
indictment; 70 and (6) whether the company's required remedial
measures are the "least intrusive to promote deterrence and
rehabilitation."' 71
This type of review would not result in institutions
automatically receiving a DPA because there is a belief that they are
"too big to jail." 72 If a judge were required to make the above findings
before a DPA could be implemented there would be a clear record to
ensure that each DPA was fair and appropriate in each circumstance that
a prosecutor seeks to implement one.' 73 Furthermore, one of the main
criticisms of DPAs is that there is no check on prosecutor behavior,
resulting in less transparency in DPA negotiations. 174  With this
proposed legislation, companies will have greater incentives to be more
164. Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 875, 902 (2009).
165. H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009).
166. Lichy, supra note 159, at 59.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 60.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Lichy, supra note 159, at 60.
173. Id.
174. Delaney, supra note 164, at 903.
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transparent in DPA negotiations if they know that a judge will be
required to approve the DPA's reasonableness before it can take effect.
VII. CONCLUSION
While there is a potential debate that corporate indictments do
not always spell death for a corporation, it is evident that they have
resulted in disastrous collateral consequences before. To remedy this
problem, prosecutors have turned to DPAs. These settlements have
their advantages, but also have the potential for prosecutorial abuse
while not providing a sufficient deterrent effect to the companies that
enter into them. Currently all that guides prosecutors in these
agreements is the Filip Memo.175 Especially in the case of independent
monitors, who can wield vast amounts of power, there is little guidance
other than the Morford Memo.' 76 Congressional legislation is needed to
provide more structure to the process and to require judicial oversight to
ensure that each DPA is fair and reasonable both to the public and the
parties in light of the circumstances in each case. Oftentimes the last
thing companies want is additional congressional interference.
However, judicial oversight could provide greater transparency in the
DPA process and greater accountability from both prosecutors and
corporate entities.
ELLIS W. MARTIN
175. See Supra Part III.
176. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't. Components, U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/morford-useofinonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf
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